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Erika B. Schlager*
Does CSCE Spell "Stability"
for Europe?
Even before the Cold War was pronounced dead, some people were
already nostalgic for it. As bad as the Cold War was, they reasoned, at
least it brought Europe stability, that magic, much sought-after dream of
rulers and the ruled alike. In a region that suffered two devastating
world wars in as many generations, stability is no small thing. But did
the Cold War really provide a degree of stability that Europe now lacks?
On the contrary, the Cold War merely pushed down the lid on a lot of
tough issues that were destined to bubble up. While the Cold War may
have seemed stable, it never really was. As long as Europeans are
oppressed by totalitarianism, they will struggle against it. And as long as
they struggle against it, Europe will not be stable.
Indeed, for decades, the signs of deeply entrenched disaffection
were evident throughout the region, for anyone who cared to look: Ber-
lin in 1953, Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, Gdansk in 1980, Brasov
in 1988. And in between these big events-the ones that made head-
lines in the West-were all the little ones, burning away the edges of
Communism like brush fires in a forest. While hand-wringing Kremli-
nologists offered little hope for the Soviet Union, Communism's days in
Eastern Europe were clearly numbered. The only real questions about
the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe were when it would come
and at what cost.
Now we have at least a partial answer to those questions. Miracu-
lously, what could not be achieved in* over four decades has been, it
seems, achieved in almost the blink of an eye. Even those of us who
were confident in the inevitable triumph of democracy could not begin
to guess that the battle would end so swiftly.
Today, former political prisoners are prime ministers, playwrights
are presidents, and decades of bitter division have passed. The unifica-
tion of Germany symbolizes the unification of an entire continent.
* Staff Member of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(the Helsinki Comm.). The views expressed herein are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent those of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe or of the U.S. Government.
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Banned books are finally published, what was unspeakable is practically
shouted, and the unthinkable already happened yesterday.
Against this heady background, the leaders of the thirty-four states
participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE)-better known as the Helsinki process-met in November 1990
in their first summit meeting since 1975. Principal among their tasks
was to acknowledge and acclaim some of the most pivotal events of our
age. In years to come, this century will be remembered for the creation
of revolutionary dictatorship at its beginning and, for much of the cen-
tury, the expansion of that dictatorship by force, by war, by occupation,
and by subversion. November's Paris Summit served notice that the his-
toric, relatively bloodless and democratic revolutions of 1989 marked
the end of an era, and the end of the twentieth century.
For the new leaders of Eastern Europe who came to Paris, many of
whom had been brutally persecuted by the Communists who formerly
ruled them, the November meeting was more than symbolic. The Sum-
mit's welcoming of the "new Europe" was a renunciation of the old. By
reaffirming its rejection of one-party, one-dictator political systems, the
community of nations sent a clear signal that there could be no return to
totalitarianism.
But beyond this cathartic function, the November Summit had a
second, overarching purpose. The CSCE's thirty-four leaders wanted to
commend to Europe a new framework in which the long-term democra-
tization of Eastern Europe would be assured, in which the emerging
democracies' "return to Europe" would take place, and in which North
American-European political relations would be conducted for the fore-
seeable future. That framework would be the new, improved, and insti-
tutionalized CSCE.
Ironically, the CSCE can trace its origins back to Soviet-sponsored
proposals in the 1950s, proposals designed to legitimize the post-war
division of Europe and to render Moscow's grip over its expanded
empire irreversible. When the West finally agreed to convene such a
conference in the early 1970's, many critics accused Western policymak-
ers of giving Moscow exactly what it wanted but plainly did not deserve.
Fifteen years have turned those views on their head.
In fact, the CSCE exceeded even the most hopeful of expectations,
becoming a rallying point for the oppressed peoples of Central and
Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the Soviet Union. As a manifesto
for the human rights movements that first flourished in the late 1970's
and ultimately triumphed in the late 1980's, the Helsinki process paved
the way for the most significant and far-reaching changes in Europe
since the end of World War II: the renunciation of the Brezhnev Doc-
trine, the release of thousands of political prisoners, free and fair elec-
tions from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and the unification of Germany.
If the Helsinki process stands for anything, it is not for Moscow's
hold over half of Europe, but for human rights and fundamental free-
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doms,1 for the principle that individuals have the right to know and act
upon those rights, 2 and for the free flow of information and ideas across
borders.3 As one totalitarian regime after another toppled in Europe,
each of the emerging emancipated leaderships pointed specifically to the
Helsinki process as a critical catalyst in the drive for democracy. When
Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, a man who one year earlier was in
a Prague jail because of his political beliefs, stood at the Paris Summit
and endorsed the CSCE as instrumental in bringing about his country's
Velvet Revolution, no one could doubt his qualifications for making
such a judgment or his sincerity.
After the revolutions of 1989 shook up the status quo, more than a
few regional organizations feared becoming marginalized in the "new
Europe" and jockeyed to secure their positions. But the CSCE's obvi-
ous achievements made it the hands-down favorite of the Paris Sum-
miteers for anchoring future political relations among participating
States. Nonetheless, the CSCE's over-arching framework should not
mask the important contributions that other international organizations
can make in the days ahead. It will take the coordinated efforts of many
actors in both the public and private sectors to protect democratic
reforms, facilitate the development of free market economies, and guard
against social unrest in Europe.
Indeed, the CSCE cannot be all things to all people. Some tasks
will be better left to other institutions such as NATO, the European
Community, and the Council of Europe. For example, as violations of
individual civil and political rights become the exception rather than the
rule in Eastern Europe, it may be more appropriate to leave their resolu-
tion to the sophisticated and highly effective machinery of the Council of
Europe's convention-based system. 4 But as former Polish Prime Minis-
ter Tadeusz Mazowiecki explained, the CSCE will be central in the "New
Europe." Speaking at the time of the Paris Summit, Mazowiecki said,
[T]he CSCE has no monopoly on cooperation in Europe. Take the Euro-
pean Community: Poland has applied for associate membership, which
we view as an important step toward full membership. We recognize the
enormously positive role of NATO as a factor in European stability. The
Council of Europe also plays an important role. But the CSCE represents
the broadest platform for agreement among European nations and with
the United States and Canada. It also provides an important institutional
framework for the participation of the Soviet Union in the life of our
continent. 5
In spite of the CSCE's pivotal role in bringing about democratic
reform, for most of its fifteen years the Helsinki process has been rela-
1. See Helsinki Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, Basket I, Principle VII, reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. at Basket III.
4. Le., the system based on the European Convention for the Preservation
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
5. Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 19, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
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tively obscure and amorphous, if it could be called a "process" at all.
Until recently, it had no permanent staff, no permanent buildings, no
standardized record keeping, and no regular schedule of meetings-not
even a mail box.
To remedy these perceived shortcomings, the "Charter of Paris for
a New Europe, '6 one of the documents agreed to at November's Sum-
mit, institutionalized the Helsinki process commensurate with its new-
found prominence. In particular, the Paris Charter provides for a
regular schedule of high-level CSCE meetings, a permanent secretariat
in Prague, an Office for Free Elections based in Warsaw, and a Center
for the Prevention of Conflicts in Vienna.
Thus, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, mandated by the Vienna
Concluding Document to open in March 1992, will be held at the head
of state or government level. Subsequent follow-up meetings will also
meet at that level, although it is not specified what stage of the follow-up
meeting the heads will attend (opening, closing, etc.). Future CSCE fol-
low-up meetings, like those previously held in Belgrade, Madrid, and
Vienna, will be held every two years, and will not exceed three months
in duration unless otherwise agreed. The meetings will continue to be
held in different cities.
A newly created CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers will meet at
least once a year and hold meetings of unspecified duration, also in
rotating locations. Meetings will be chaired by the representative of the
host country. This political taskmaster will oversee the progress of the
CSCE process, prepare for meetings of the CSCE heads of state and
government, and set the CSCE agenda.
The Paris Charter also establishes a CSCE Committee of Senior
Officials. Committee meetings will be chaired by a representative of the
state whose Foreign Minister chaired the preceding Council meeting.
As a rule, the Committee will meet for two-day sessions, as often as nec-
essary. Meetings of the Committee will take place at the newly estab-
lished secretariat in Prague, except for meetings that immediately
precede a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Those meetings
will take place at the location of the Council meeting. The Committee
will prepare for meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, review
current issues, and implement the decisions of the Council. Most
importantly, this group will set the agenda for meetings of the Foreign
Ministers and, as a consequence, may be the most important working
group of the new CSCE.
Drafts of the Paris Charter attempted to establish a procedure for
convening two-day emergency meetings of the Council of Foreign Min-
isters in the event of a crisis arising from a violation of a principle of the
Helsinki Final Act or from a civil disturbance. Such a meeting would
have been called if concerned states were unable to resolve the situation
6. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190
(1991) [hereinafter Paris Charter].
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within forty-eight hours. The concept of calling emergency or "snap"
CSCE meetings had been discussed previously, but the Paris Charter
reflects the continuing differences among participating states regarding
the system for calling such meetings. In particular, the drafters were
unable to formulate a process for convening emergency sessions that
would not be subject to abuse. 7 In the end, the agreed language merely
provides that the "Council will discuss the possibility of establishing a
mechanism for convening meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials
in emergency situations."
A CSCE administrative secretariat will be established in Prague,
Czechoslovakia. It will maintain and circulate CSCE documents to par-
ticipating States, provide information on the CSCE to the press and
public as well as to non-governmental organizations, international orga-
nizations, and non-participating States. It will also support the meetings
of the Council and the Committee as well as the executive secretaries of
"CSCE summit meetings, follow-up meetings, and inter-sessional meet-
ings." The secretariat staff will consist of a director, three officers, and
other administrative staff.
A CSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), established in Vienna,
Austria, "will assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict."' 0 The
CPC's primary focus is the exchange of information as required under
the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) Agreement, " I
which was concluded just prior to the Paris Summit. Although the Char-
ter also provides that the CPC's mandate may be extended in the future
to include tasks related to the conciliation of disputes and dispute settle-
ment, this rather ambiguous provision in fact reflects the lack of consen-
sus among the drafters regarding the appropriateness of linking
peaceful settlements of disputes to the technical military/security work
of the CSBMs. Hopes that the January 1991 Valletta Meeting on Peace-
ful Settlements of Disputes would resolve this issue were not realized.
At that meeting, delegations drafted a limited mechanism designed to
facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes, but could not reach con-
sensus regarding whether the mechanism should be housed at the
Vienna CPC or elsewhere. Consequently, the entire mechanism is
7. Some delegations feared that a provision providing for emergency meetings
might be used in cases that those delegations simply did not consider emergencies.
8. Paris Charter, supra note 6, at 210. During an ad hoc meeting of experts con-
vened in January 1991 to discuss administrative, financial, and personnel issues of
the new CSCE institutions, the Austrian delegation proposed an emergency meeting
in response to the Soviet crackdown in the occupied Baltic Republics. The Soviet
Union denied consensus to the convening of such an emergency meeting.
9. Id. at 211. Because the Paris Charter does not indicate otherwise, meetings of
the Council of Ministers will presumably be staffed by secretariats provided by the
host country, in accordance with CSCE practice.
10. Id. at 212.
11. Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures, reprinted in Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Dispatch
Supplement, Vol. 2, Supplement No. 2 (May 1991).
Cornell International Law Journal
inoperable until that question is resolved. In addition, the mechanism is
undermined by a self-judging exceptions clause.
The CPC will work under the direction of a CSCE Consultative
Committee, made up of the heads of delegation to the ongoing CSCE
negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).
This Committee will be responsible in its work to the Council of Foreign
Ministers. While the CSBMs agreement provides a relatively concrete
scope for the current work of the Consultative Committee, the structure
of its work is largely undefined.1 2 In this respect, the Consultative Com-
mittee will function like most traditional CSCE meetings. The CPC will
have a secretariat consisting of a director, two officers, and administra-
tive and technical personnel.1 3
A CSCE Office for Free Elections (OFE) will be located in Warsaw,
Poland. It will facilitate the implementation of the commitments in the
Copenhagen Document 14 regarding free and fair elections. In particu-
lar, the office will compile and transmit information regarding elections
in the participating States and facilitate sending governmental and non-
governmental observers to those elections. The OFE will be staffed by a
director, one officer, and administrative personnel. A cryptic provision
noting that the "office will carry out other tasks assigned to it by the
Council" 15 reflects the efforts by some drafters to broaden the scope of
the OFE to include other aspects of democratic institution building.
Although a parliamentary assembly is envisioned in the Paris Char-
ter, the document fails to enunciate the structure of such a body. To
some degree this reflects differences among participating States regard-
ing how the body should be organized.i 6 It may also reflect the need to
involve legislatures directly in the process of addressing this question.
In the wake of the transformation of Europe and the elevation of
the CSCE, expectations for what the Helsinki process can accomplish
run high. The CSCE is now touted as Europe's "premier post-Cold War
forum." 17 President Bush and Secretary Baker have called upon the
Conference to "contribute to the construction of a whole Europe, a free
Europe, a secure Europe,"1 8 and see in the CSCE the potential to
12. The mandate provides that the Consultative Committee will operate accord-
ing to CSCE procedures. Paris Charter, supra note 6, at 213.
13. Id. at 213. The CSBMs agreement also provides for the establishment of a
"communications network." The Paris Charter notes that this network might "be
used for other CSCE-related purposes."
14. Reprinted in 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 232 (1990).
15. Paris Charter, supra note 6, at 214.
16. There is a stated preference on the part of many participating States to link a
CSCE to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly. See, e.g., Bureau of Public
Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Selected Doc. No. 38, NATO Communique ofJuly, 1990.
However, at least in the case of the United States, this pronouncement only reflects
the views of the administration and not the collective voice of the legislature.
17. Rosenfeld, A Timely Warning, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1990, at A29, col. 1.
18. Baker, CSCE: Building Together for the Future, I Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept.
of State, Dispatch No. 6, 155 (1990).
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"forge a new transatlantic partnership." 19 In part, this attitude reflects
the genuine success of the Helsinki process. But to some degree, the
praises sung for the CSCE also reflect an element of wishful thinking,
the aspiration as much as the anticipation that the Helsinki process can
deal with new problems as well as it dealt with the old. While the CSCE
once had a credibility problem, today it must stand to meet the tide of
rising expectations. It remains to be seen whether those expectations
can be fulfilled.
Even during the euphoria of the Paris Summit, the tremendous
obstacles to the continuation and maintenance of democratization in the
East were apparent. Over the last few years as glasnost has emerged as
the dominant political reality in the Soviet Union, violent ethnic clashes
have taken place in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where states of emer-
gency dot the landscape like flickering lights in a small village at dusk.
Slowly but surely, quietly but continuously, the death toll from these
clashes has risen to the hundreds. And even as the promise ofperestroika
has taken hold among Moscow's economic reformers, the already ailing
Soviet economy, one of the largest in the world, has deteriorated at a
truly alarming rate.
In Eastern Europe, where the process of reform has advanced much
further, similar problems exist, although often on a quite different scale.
Since the overthrow of the Ceaucescu regime, for example, hundreds of
Romanian citizens have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Some
of them are trying to escape the still oppressive economic conditions of
their own country; others, particularly ethnic minorities, fear for their
physical safety in a country where, for the first time in decades, one has
the freedom to express even the most outrageous ideas and the most
bigoted of beliefs. Romania is hardly alone; other countries in the
region face their own versions of these difficulties, shaped by their own
particular history, geography, and ethnic diversity.
In many respects, the problems facing today's Europe are no less
challenging than those created by the former division of Europe into
two armed camps. The most serious problems are closely interrelated,
each having the potential to exacerbate the others. Today, five distinct
and identifiable elements most threaten the process of democratization
in Europe:
(1) the devastated economies and ecologies of Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, some of which are potential "black holes," suck-
ing scarce Western resources into a vacuum;
(2) ethnic strife between majority populations and the minorities
trapped by history in pockets among them, including minorities that
have no "homeland" or state to sponsor their cause, such as the
Kurds;
19. Bush, CSCE: The Power of Principle, 1 Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept. of State,
Dispatch No. 6, 154 (1990).
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(3) restive independence movements in voluntarily formed states,
such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as in the Soviet
Empire;
(4) the threat of a tidal wave of migrants, generally flowing from
East to West, spurred by economic dislocation and ethnic violence;
and
(5) the unrequited security needs of Europe as the disintegration of
the Warsaw Pact leaves its former members free of the collective
arrangement that was so often an excuse for invasion and repres-
sion, but also free of any other system that might provide them with
the genuine security they seek.
Each of these problems has compelling humanitarian implications
on its own. But each also has the capacity to destabilize Europe in whole
or in part. While in the past the greatest threat to Europe stemmed
from the potential of armed conflict, today, the greatest threat to
Europe may arise from these five concerns.
Recent events in the Baltic States have forced the CSCE to address
some of these questions head on. In January 1991, while the world's
attention was focused on the Persian Gulf, Soviet Interior Ministry
troops shot and killed peaceful, unarmed civilians in the Soviet-occupied
Republics of Lithuania and Latvia. In subsequent statements, the Soviet
Union's highest ranking leaders, including President Gorbachev, denied
responsibility for these events. The prospect that perhaps the Soviet
leadership really did not control its own military forces has contributed
to delays in the ratification by the United States of the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, one of the capstones of the Paris Sum-
mit. As one U.S. Senator posited, "why on earth would we be seeking to
sign an arms control agreement with a man who does not control his
military?" 20 An alternative interpretation, that Moscow not only knew
about these attacks but planned and ordered them in cynical violation of
the commitments pledged as recently as last November, is not much
more reassuring.
Clearly, a more sober look at what the CSCE can really do about
these problems is in order. A variety of new hurdles within the process
is already discernible and will impact on the ability of the process to
achieve its primary goals of improving security and cooperation in North
America and Europe.
Traditionally, the CSCE's effectiveness has largely stemmed from
the willingness of participating States to use the process as a forum to
hold the human rights practices of the East up to public scrutiny. For
over fifteen years, Western countries, haltingly at first and with a greater
sense of purpose later, publicly identified refuseniks, political prisoners,
persecuted religious activists, and a host of other victims of the East's
20. Federal News Service, Jan. 14, 1991 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, WIRES file)
(statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop, at a press briefing on the Baltics sponsored by
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe).
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human rights abuses. In meeting after meeting, Western delegates to
the CSCE became more and more willing to demand information about
the fate of these people and to seek positive resolutions of their cases. It
is no wonder that Eastern Europe's newly liberated political leaderships
believe that the public pressure generated by the Helsinki process acted
as their sword and shield during their long struggle for democratic
reform.
Recently, many of the issues which have long divided East and West
have been fading away. For example, the Soviet Union seems to be
shifting to a defensive military doctrine, Moscow's grip on Eastern
Europe is receding, the forced division of Germany has ended, and the
widespread, systematic denial of individual civil and political rights is on
the decline. And it seems that the more comfortable we become with a
country as a whole, the more uncomfortable we are with criticizing it in
part. As a consequence, the West seems almost as reluctant to raise
publicly the issue of the Baltic States with Mikhail Gorbachev as it is
disinclined to raise the issue of Northern Cyprus with its long-standing
NATO ally, Turkey. There is even growing doubt as to whether the
United States would respond in a meaningful way in the event that Presi-
dent Gorbachev engaged in a widespread military crackdown in the
name of national stability. The administration's response to the January
crackdown in the Baltics, canceling the Bush-Gorbachev summit while
declining to identify the crackdown as the reason for so doing, does not
qualify as meaningful.
The CSCE's tasks are further complicated by the breakdown of
traditional alliances for coordination and negotiation within the CSCE.
Formally, the CSCE takes place "outside of military alliances," and each
State participates "as sovereign and independent ... in conditions of
full equality." 2 1 But because all decisions in the Helsinki process must
be reached on the basis of consensus, the informal network for coordi-
nation and negotiation is critical to the process of decision making. As a
practical matter, the only participating State that does not coordinate its
position with other countries is the Holy See.
The change in negotiating patterns, exemplified by the disintegra-
tion of the Warsaw Pact, is in some ways a welcome development-after
all, throughout its history the Warsaw Pact stood for the forcible domi-
nation of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe. But no other viable
unit for coordination has replaced it, leaving its former members search-
ing for a new modus operandi. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact's dissolution
has an impact beyond just its final six members. To the extent that the
raison d'etre of the neutral and non-aligned (the NNA) was that its mem-
bers were neither in the Warsaw Pact nor in NATO, the removal of one
end of the bipolar spectrum has removed a point of definition for the
21. Rule 65, Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations ("the Blue
Book"), reprinted in FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA: BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI
PROCESS 27 - 42 (A. Bloed ed. 1990) [hereinafter FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA].
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NNA.2 2 And the neutrals' traditional and useful role as CSCE coordina-
tors may need to be reevaluated as they take on strong national posi-
tions of their own and hence are no longer really "neutral." '23
The West has also lost much of its former cohesion. In some cases,
tight coordination among the European Communities' twelve member
States leaves little room for discussion among NATO's sixteen. In other
cases, there is less common ground to stand on than in the past and,
consequently, neither the twelve nor the sixteen are able to forge a com-
mon position. Increasingly, CSCE coordinators must find compromises
between not just three or four or five sets of views, but thirty-four, an
unwieldy prospect at best.
This phenomenon may ultimately resolve itself through the forma-
tion of new negotiating groups that may coordinate their efforts on spe-
cific subjects where common interests exist, without necessarily
prejudicing the interests of other formal alliances such as NATO or the
EC. The Nordic countries have done this for some years now on envi-
ronmental issues. More recently, a new group called the Pentagonale
has emerged and may serve a similar function.2 4 It remains unclear
whether a profusion of interest-based mini-groups will facilitate or slow
down the CSCE in the long run.
These new uncertainties in the negotiating process appear at a time
when the pressure to get the symbols of achievements, if not actual
achievements, is at a peak. At the June 1990 Copenhagen meeting on
the human dimension, for example, the drive for a consensus document
was intense, as countries sought both to recognize human rights
improvements that had taken place and, at the same time, make back-
sliding from those improvements more difficult. As a consequence, in
the first week of the meeting no less than thirty delegations rushed to
support a human rights proposal spearheaded by the EC that, on close
inspection, largely repeated commitments already undertaken in other
human rights documents. 25 While in the end the Copenhagen Docu-
22. It is also an open question what will be the result, if any, as other neutrals join
Ireland in the EC. Not only do Austria, Sweden and Finland have pending applica-
tions to join the EC, but Hungary and Poland have requested associative status.
23. In Copenhagen, Austria deftly managed both to promote a Pentagonale pro-
posal on minorities (CHDC.5) and to act as coordinator of the working group on
minorities. Such skill is fortuitous but by no means guaranteed. At the Valletta
Meeting on the Peaceful Settlements of Disputes, Switzerland and Austria were so
strongly associated with a single proposal (PSDV.1) that the role of coordinator went
to a NATO country, Norway.
24. The Pentagonale consists of one NATO country, Italy; two neutral countries,
Austria and Yugoslavia; and two former Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary and Czech-
oslovakia. Their common borders and history have led to common interests in a
number of areas, ranging from regularizing their trucking industries to improving
protection of minority rights.
25. See Proposal CHDC.16, introduced on June 8, 1990. This proposal contains,
for example, the provision that, "Everyone will have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right includes the freedom to change one's religion or
belief and freedom to manifest one's religion or belief, either alone or in community
with others, in public or in private, through worship, teaching, practice and obser-
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ment did include unprecedented language identifying the essential ele-
ments for a system of democracy, 26 the CSCE may damage its credibility
if, in the rush to promote itself, it fosters the adoption of too many
watered-down or repetitive proclamations.
When the CSCE does adopt new and significant commitments, as it
ultimately did in Copenhagen, it must ensure that adequate considera-
tion is given to the implementation of those commitments. It is critical
that the compliance of participating States with the pledges they have
freely undertaken be subject to careful scrutiny at upcoming CSCE
meetings. The CSCE must not become a forum for the production of
hollow communiques. Guarantees of the independence of the judiciary,
the accountability of the military to civilian authorities, and the separa-
tion of the state from political parties are just a few of the promises
made last June that raised the CSCE to a new level of ambition. Imple-
mentation review, a traditional mainstay of the CSCE process, can help
ensure that those promises are fulfilled.
With the signing of the Paris Charter, a turning point in the history
of the CSCE, the Helsinki process is entering a new era in which signifi-
cant differences can already be discerned. In the early years, before the
Paris Charter, issues such as the protection and promotion of individual
civil and political rights, especially freedom of speech, freedom of asso-
ciation, freedom of religion, and the right to leave and return to one's
country, came to dominate the CSCE's human rights agenda. In many
respects, efforts to enunciate standards for a system of democracy,
including standards for the rule of law and free and fair elections,
belong to this category. The CSCE is now entering a second era. A new
set of issues is moving to the forefront: economic instability, ethnic
rivalry, restive independence movements, potential waves of refugees,
and security concerns. 2 7 Ironically, the emergence of many second-era
vance. The exercise of these rights may be subject only to such restrictions as are
prescribed by law and are consistent with international standards." This basic com-
mitment is already reflected in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 9
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See R.
SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 321 - 326 (1983) for a com-
parison of these various texts, and 16 & 17, section on Principles, the Vienna
Concluding Document, reprinted in FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA, supra note 21, at 181.
Query whether the repetition of this language in the Copenhagen Document at 9.4,
supra note 14, at 236, or for that matter, in its abbreviated version in the Paris Char-
ter, significantly adds to the promotion of the right in question. Although in some
cases the repetition of a particular right may have great symbolic value (possibly, for
example, the right to leave and return), the ultimate test of the utility of a CSCE
commitment is reflected in the willingness of participating States to use the agreed
language to raise and resolve cases and situations in the CSCE context.
26. See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, § I., 3, 4, 5.1 - 5.4, 5.6, and 5.9, supra note
14, at 233-34.
27. This is not to suggest that second-era problems did not exist in the past, or
that first-era problems will not exist in the future; rather, it reflects the shifting polit-
ical priority attached to the issues over many years. Thus, for example, while the
duty of participating States to respect national minority rights (characterized here as
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issues derives from the achievement of significant progress in the resolu-
tion of first-era issues. Had there not been considerable improvement
with respect to the right to leave and return, there would not be such
anxiety today over potential waves of migrants. Had free speech
remained highly controlled in the East, there would probably be less
concern over latent ethnic tension.
By the time the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe was signed in 1975, there had already been substantial
progress in elaborating these first-era issues, particularly standards for
individual civil and political rights. Helsinki, after all, did not spring
fully formed like Athena from the head of Zeus, but was built on the
decades of experience derived from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
While setting human rights standards did not guarantee their realiza-
tion, the CSCE's follow-up process enabled nations to spur one another
toward their implementation. One of the CSCE's greatest contributions
to the field of human rights came through its role as a vehicle for pub-
licly raising violations of agreed standards. This process was facilitated
by the general consensus among the Western countries, and to a great
extent among the neutral and non-aligned, regarding what those stan-
dards meant, not just on paper but in actual practice.
In contrast, the squeamishness with which the second-era issues are
approached reflects, in considerable part, the lack of elaborated norms
or standards governing these issues. Indeed, one distinguishing charac-
teristic of the second-era issues is that, while there may be general
agreement among participating States that a problem exists and that it
must be addressed, there is no coherent set or sets of views regarding
how to remedy it. First-era issues were comparatively easier both to
identify and to redress. For example, Eastern political prisoners were
relatively easy for Western countries to identify and the remedy was
equally simple: let them go. Today, there is no proposed solution to
the questions of minorities, self-determination, migration, etc., that
seems likely to gain consensus, at least in the near term, even among a
small subset of participating States.
Because of these new phenomena, the change in the kinds of
problems confronting the CSCE and the shifting sands in the negotiat-
ing process, the CSCE countries have not yet found a way to deal with
these second-era issues. Under these circumstances, participating States
not only risk undermining the credibility of the Helsinki process, but
also risk engaging in a conspiracy of silence in which difficult problems
are not raised and resolved, but fester and spread. Decades of totalitar-
ian enforced silence have not made Europe's tough issues go away. If
second-era rights) was acknowledged in Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act, it is
only in the wake of the 1989 revolutions that this issue has become widely perceived
as urgent.
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the CSCE is to help resolve these challenges, it must once again find its
voice.
As a result, chief among the CSCE's new tasks must be an attempt
to flesh out the parameters of these problems. Under the consensus
system of decision-making, this work was not easily accomplished in the
past and it will certainly be no easier now. The issues confronting
Europe today are often more complex than the seemingly black-and-
white issues of the Cold War era and, consequently, reaching agreement
on new standards in these areas will not be accomplished overnight. But
it will not be enough to say simply that minorities have rights or that
there exists some kind of right to self-determination, that a market is
good, or that territorial occupation is bad. It is essential that the CSCE
deal with these issues in concrete terms, using real life examples.
To do so, it will be necessary to overcome the unspoken and mis-
taken belief that raising these issues will, in fact, exacerbate them. Some
analysts have suggested privately that at a time when the Soviet Union
faces civil unrest from so many quarters, not the least of which stems
from its diverse ethnic makeup, the West should not do anything which
might further the potential for civil war. It is right to want stability in
the Soviet Union, but stability will never be achieved so long as nations,
like the individual citizens who comprise them, remain oppressed and
subjugated.
Some progress in these areas may be made at CSCE inter-sessional
meetings scheduled for later this year, one on national minorities to be
held inJuly 1991 in Geneva, and one on human rights and humanitarian
affairs that will open in September 1991 in Moscow. It would be an
encouraging sign if at the next main CSCE review meeting, scheduled to
open in Helsinki in 1992, an additional inter-sessional meeting could be
scheduled devoted to the thorny question of self-determination, as Rep-
resentative Steny Hoyer, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security
and Cooperation, has suggested.
28
Does CSCE spell stability for Europe? Perhaps. Today, the Hel-
sinki process is uniquely positioned at least to try to preempt the dangers
to security and cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic. If it is to suc-
ceed in doing so, it must find its voice. It must seek to ensure imple-
mentation of existing commitments while it strives to elaborate new
ones, in new areas. And it must find new ways to forge consensus
among its diverse participants. But most importantly, the CSCE partici-
pants should not wait for the outbreak of atrocities or the specter of civil
war before seizing the initiative and trying to achieve these goals.
28. S. Hoyer, Speech at a Conference Sponsored by the Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy and the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown Univer-
sity, March 6, 1991, titled CSCE and the Blueprint for Europe.

